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Abstract
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle’s (1985) is studied, in which
noise traders may be partially informed, or alternatively they can
be manipulated. Unlike Kyle’s assumption that the quantity traded
by the noise traders is independent of the asset value, we assume
that the noise traders are able to correlate their trade with the true
price. This has several implications for the equilibrium, one being that
the insider’s expected profits decrease as the noise traders’ ability to
correlate positively improve. In the limit, the noise traders do not lose
on average, and the insider makes zero expected profits. When the
correlation is negative, we interpret this as manipulation. In this case
the insider makes the highest expected profits, and the informativeness
of prices is at its minimum.
KEYWORDS: Insider trading, asymmetric information, strategic
trade, correlated trade, partially informed noise traders
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper on insider trading, Albert Kyle (1985) asks several
questions: How valuable is private information to an insider? How does
∗Norwegian School of Economics 5045 Bergen, Norway and Centre of Mathematics for
Applications (CMA), University of Oslo, Norway. The research leading to these results has
received funding from the European Research Council under the European Community’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement no [228087]
1
noise trading affect the volatility of prices? What determines the liquidity of
a speculative market? He provides answers to these and other questions by
modeling rigorously the trading strategy of an insider in a model of efficient
price information.
We focus on the single auction model in which one risky asset is exchanged
for a riskless asset among three kinds of traders: a single insider who has
access to private observation of the ex post liquidation value of the risky
asset: less informed noise traders who must trade; and market makers who
set prices conditional on information they have about the quantities traded
by others. Trading is modeled as a single auction.
In the standard model the noise traders can be considered as less than
fully rational, since the average profits of the insider is exactly what the noise
traders lose, while the market makers are making zero profits. The market
makers cannot distinguish the trading of the insider from the trading of the
noise traders, who in effect provide camouflage which enables the insider to
make profits on their expense.
In economics one ideally prefers all agents in the model to be rational,
like in game theory, but when modeling insider trading this goal is difficult
to fulfill. The rational expectations equilibrium models assume that traders
maximize expected utility with rational beliefs, where the latter are defined
to be consistent with the model itself. Noise was not viewed as stemming
from incorrect beliefs, was somewhat vague and corresponded to a random
error term added to the aggregated excess demand function. The existence of
noise traders was intitially put forth as a solution to the ”no trade” result of
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Understanding the role of ”noise” appeared to
require a different framework, and was done by Kyle (1985) and Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). These authors identified certain people as trading in a way
which makes noise in a sense that their trade is not based on information.
A reasonable response to the presence of insiders in a market would be
to avoid trading in this market altogether. In real stock markets people
may have an idea that insiders exist, yet trade takes place in these markets.
Liquidity (noise) traders presumably trade for other reasons than maximizing
profits, one being that they simply need liquidity. In general the situation
may be viewed to have a certain resemblance to gambling. Although people
know that on average they lose, still some lucky ones do win, which motivates
some people to participate.
The details of the identity of noise traders or liquidity traders were ini-
tially left vague. Notably, noise traders were modeled as equally likely to be
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buying or selling securities, which while making models technically tractable,
is counterintuitive. Exogenous reasons for needing money, and hence having
to sell securities seem more natural than exogenous reasons for having to buy
securities.
Both the standard model and the model we suggest can be seen as an
attempt to model reality as rigorously as possible, subject to certain limita-
tions. Our framework is, however, closer to the ideal of game theory than
the standard one, since we allow the noise traders to be partially informed.
The degree of information held by the noise traders is measured by a
correlation coefficient, and when this takes its maximum value of one, they
are in effect equally informed as the insider, in which case all participants
in the market make zero profits on average. Thus the noise traders in our
model are not equally likely to be selling or buying securities.
In the present model the noise traders may also correlate their trade
negatively with the true value. The reason for this is outside the model, but
if this happens, the insider makes more profits than in the uncorrelated case
at the noise traders expense. Negative correlation can occur for different
reasons, one being that the insider, who has privileged information, is able
to mislead the noise traders.
Such situations may seem unlikely to fit into a neo-classical equilibrium,
but as we demonstrate, it is sustainable in the framework of insider trading.
Originally we attempted to describe these phenomena in a continuous
time context as in Aase et. al. (2011b), which would allowed us to study
other questions as well, related to a dynamic economy, like how does colored
noise trading affect the volatility of prices? Also smart money would then
have a limited horizon over which trade can occur. This model is related to
the one in Back (1992), as well as the continuous version in Kyle (1985), but
is a more direct approach. However, confronted by some technical difficulties
in connection with the associated filtering theory (e.g., Aase et. al. (2011a)),
we decided to first study a single auction.
There is a vast literature on insider trading, and in particular the question
of who the noise traders are. It is the hope that our paper will shed some fur-
ther light on this latter question. Regarding the topic of rationality, Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992) replaced Kyle’s uninformed liquidity traders with
strategic utility-maximizing agents trading for hedging purposes. Diamond
and Verrecchia (1981) suggest adding a noise term to agents’ risk exposures.
Risk-averse agents will then have an insurance motive for trading. De Marzo
and Duffie (1999) propose a model where different traders have different dis-
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count rates. These papers solve the problem of finding a logically consistent
model that can be used for e.g., welfare statements, of markets with imperfect
information revelation.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990), Dow and Gorton (1994),
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose limits to arbitrage in order to explain
that noise traders are not eliminated by informed traders. The view that
noise traders are less than rational is discussed in Shiller (1984), Schleifer
and Summers (1990) and Barberis and Thaler (2003). Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) introduce two types of liquidity traders, discretionary and non-
discretionary. Dow and Gorton (2006) present a broad review of various
aspects of noise traders, and conclude that the their identities, motivations
and ability to persist remain topics of research.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we find an equilibrium in
a one period model with correlated noise trades, in Section 3 we discuss the
properties of the equilibrium, and Section 4 concludes.
2 A single auction equilibrium
In this section we find an equilibrium in the one period model with correlated
trades. The structure of the model is the following: There are two dates, 0
and T . The risky asset value v˜ is normally distributed at date 0 with mean
p0 and variance σ
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v , in short, v˜ ∼ N (p0, σ2v). The insider knows the date
T realization v˜obs = v at time 0, the others observe v˜ at T to be v. The
quantity traded by the noise traders is z˜, where z˜ ∼ N (0, σ2z). While Kyle
(1985) assumes z˜ and v˜ to be independent, we assume (z˜, v˜) to be jointly
normally distributed with correlation coefficient ρ. One interpretation is
that when ρ > 0, the noise traders are more rational than in the standard
model. If ρ < 0 on the other hand, we interpret this as manipulation, i.e.,
the noise traders have been manipulated by the other market participants.
The quantity traded by the insider is x˜, the price is denoted p˜.
Trading is structured in two steps as follows: In step one, the exogenous
values of v˜ and z˜ are realized and the insider chooses the quantity x˜ he trades.
In doing so, he observes v˜obs = v, but not z˜. The insider’s trading strategy
is given by some real, measurable function x : R→ R, i.e., x˜ = x(v˜).
In step two the market makers determine the price p˜ at which they trade
the quantity necessary to clear the market. In doing so they observe (x˜ +
z˜) but not x˜ or z˜ separately. Their pricing rule is determined by a real,
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measurable function p : R → R so that p˜ = p(x˜ + z˜). The insider’s profit
is denoted by p˜i, where p˜i = (v˜ − p˜)x˜. Since p˜i and p˜ depend upon the real
functions x(·) and p(·), we may write p˜i = p˜i(x, p) and p˜ = p˜(x, p). We assume
risk neutrality.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair of functions (x, p) such that the
following two conditions hold:
(1) Profit maximization: For any other trading strategy x′ and for any v
E{p˜i(x, p)|v˜ = v} ≥ E{p˜i(x′, p)|v˜ = v}.
(2) Market efficiency: The market price p˜ satisfies
p˜(x, p) = E{v˜|x˜+ z˜}.
This model is not purely game theoretic, because the noise traders do not
explicitly maximize any particular objective. However, in our model they
may act rational, as we shall see. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 2.1. There exists a unique equilibrium in which x and p are linear
functions. Defining
β =
1
2
σz
σv
(√
4− 3ρ2 − ρ
)
and λ =
σv
σz
√
4− 3ρ2
the equilibrium is given by
x(v˜) = β(v˜ − p0), p(x˜+ z˜) = p0 + λ(x˜+ z˜).
Proof. We conjecture a liner equilibrium of the following type:
p(y) = µ+ λy, (y = x+ z), x(v) = α + βv
for some constants µ, λ, α and β. Given the linear rule p(·), the insider’s
profits can be written
E{[v˜ − p(x˜+ z˜)]x|v˜ = v} = [v − µ− λx− λρσz
σv
(v − p0)]x,
which follows, since by our assumption that (z˜, v˜) is binormal,
E{z˜|v˜ = v} = ρσz
σv
(v − p0)
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by the projection theorem. Profit maximization of this quadratic objective
requires that x solves
v − µ− λρσz
σv
(v − p0)− 2λx = 0
or
x = (
1
2λ
− 1
2
ρ
σz
σv
)v +
1
2
ρ
σz
σv
p0 − 1
2λ
µ.
In other words, x(v) = βv + α where the constants α and β are given by
(2.1) α =
1
2
ρ
σz
σv
p0 − 1
2λ
µ and β =
1
2λ
− 1
2
ρ
σz
σv
.
Given x and p, the market efficiency condition is equivalent to (y˜ = x˜+ z˜)
(2.2) p˜(x, p) = µ+ λy = E{v˜|α + βv˜ + z˜ = y}.
Proceeding as above, this expression is computed as follows:
p˜(x, p) = p0 + ρX,Y σv
y − (α + βp0)√
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρ σzσv
,
where
ρX,Y =
cov(v˜, α + βv˜ + z˜)
σv
√
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρ σzσv
and cov(v˜, α + βv˜ + z˜) = βσ2v + ρσzσv.
Hence the pricing rule is filtered out as
p˜(x, p) = p0 +
βσ2v + ρσzσv
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρ σzσv
(
y − (α + βp0)
)
.
Comparing to (2.2) the constants µ and λ are given by
(2.3) µ = p0 − λ(α + βp0) and λ = βσ
2
v + ρσzσv
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρ σzσv
.
In order to find the equilibrium, we have to solve the four equations given in
(2.1) and (2.3) in the four unknowns α, β, µ and λ.
Starting with (2.1) we notice that α+βp0 = (p0−µ)/2λ, and inserted in
the first of the equations in (2.3) we get µ − p0 = (µ − p0)/2 which implies
that µ = p0. The first of the equations in (2.1) can therefore be written
α = p0
(
− 1
2λ
+
ρ
2
σz
σv
)
= −p0β,
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where the last equality follows from the expression for β in (2.1). Accordingly
α = −µβ = −p0β, and the pricing rule simplifies to p˜(x, p) = p0 + λy.
Furthermore the insider’s demand function can be written x(v˜) = βv˜ + α =
β(v˜ − p0), which is a very natural result.
It remains to determine λ and β from the other parameters. Starting
with β we see that
β =
1
2λ
− 1
2
ρ
σz
σv
=
β2σ2v + 2βρσzσv + σ
2
z
2(βσ2v + ρ σzσv)
− 1
2
ρ
σz
σv
,
which means that β must satisfy the quadratic equation
β2 + ρ
σz
σv
β +
σ2z
σ2v
(ρ2 − 1) = 0.
Only a positive trading intensity is allowed, which means that
β =
1
2
σz
σv
(
√
4− 3ρ2 − ρ).
Finally, using the connection between λ and β we obtain
λ =
σv
σz
√
4− 3ρ2 .
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
We recall what it means for two random variables to be correlated: In this
model there exists a mean zero random variable  such that z˜ = a+bv˜+˜ with
probability one, where ˜ and v˜ are orthogonal in the meaning E(v˜ ˜) = 0.1
The constant b has the same sign as ρ. When |ρ| = 1 the random variable
 = 0 with probability one. We may interpret the part a + bv˜ of z˜ as the
”informed part” and the term ˜ as the pure noise trader part. If the insider
has less than full information about the true price, his information can be
represented in this way, for some non-zero a and b. The standard model
treats the case a = b = 0, so that z˜ = ˜ with probability one.
3 Properties of the equilibrium
The first observation we make is that when ρ = 0, then β = σz/σv and
λ = σv/2σz which are the same expressions as given by Kyle (1985). When
this is the case, our model is the same as the standard one.
1In a normal universe this also implies that ˜ and v˜ are independent.
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The results in Theorem 2.1 are so explicit that they enable us to study
the effects of the correlation coefficient ρ on the equilibrium.
Starting with the depth of the market, it is equal to 1/λ(ρ), and seen to
be symmetric in ρ with maximal value 2σz/σv at ρ = 0, and minimal values
σz/σv at |ρ| = 1 (see Fig. 1 when σz = σv = 1).
Fig. 1: Market depth 1
λ(ρ)
as a function of ρ
.
This quantity measures the trade, i.e., order flow, necessary to change
the price by one unit of account. It is natural that this amount is at its
smallest when the information in the market is at its highest, i.e., when the
correlation coefficient ρ equals plus or minus one. When ρ = 0 this measure
1/λ(0) = 2σz/σv is proportional to the amount of noise trading to the amount
of private information the insider is expected to have. An interpretation is
that market makers compensate themselves for the bad trades due to adverse
selection of insiders by making the market less liquid. When the noise traders
have information (ρ > 0), or are manipulated (ρ < 0) by the insider, the
market makers’ need to compensate themselves in this way is diminished.
The liquidity parameter λ(ρ) increases as |ρ| increases, which is natural,
since the market makers then gradually know more about the true price from
the trades made, and thus put more weight on the aggregate market orders
when forming prices.
A simple measure of informativeness of prices is defined by
ι := 1− var(v˜|p˜)
var(v˜)
.
When the price carries no private information about the true value of the
asset, the conditional variance equals the unconditional variance, and ι =
0. When the price leaves no uncertainty left in the value of the asset, the
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conditional variance equals zero and ι = 1, in which case all the private
information is included in the price. Thus 0 ≤ ι ≤ 1.
Using properties of the bivariate normal distribution of (v˜, p˜), we obtain
the expression
ι(ρ) =
(
1− var(v˜|p˜)
σ2v
)
=
(
1− σ
2
z(1− ρ2)
β2σ2v + 2βρσzσv + σ
2
z
)
.
Inserting the expression for the trading intensity β(ρ) of the insider, we obtain
ι(ρ) =
(
1− (1− ρ
2)
2− 3
2
ρ2 + 1
2
ρ
√
(4− 3ρ2)
)
in equilibrium. As in the standard model (ρ = 0), the measure of informa-
tiveness is unaffected by the level of noise trading (σz). As a function of ρ
the measure ι(ρ) is antisymmetric and increases from 0 when ρ = −1 to 1
when ρ = 1. 2 Figure 2 illustrates.
Fig. 2: Informativeness ι(ρ) as a function of ρ
.
When ρ = 0 the informativeness ι(0) = 1
2
, i.e., one-half of the insider’s
private information is incorporated into prices. When ρ = 1 all the private
information is included in the price, and when ρ = −1 the price carries no
private information. As ρ increases, trade takes place between more and
more equally informed parties, and more information about the true value
of the asset becomes revealed in its price. Also the market makers increase
the liquidity parameter λ(ρ), which works in the same direction. When ρ is
negative we interpret this as manipulation, and the informativeness in prices
is naturally low.
2We use L’Hoˆpital’s rule to verify that ι(ρ) ↓ 0 when ρ ↓ −1.
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When ρ increases, information becomes distributed more and more like
in a rational expectations equilibrium, although the level of information is
much higher.
The trading intensity β(ρ) as a function of ρ of Theorem 2.1 is illustrated
in Fig. 3 when σz = σv = 1.
Fig. 3: Trading intensity β(ρ) as a function of ρ
It has its maximum of β(ρ∗) = 2√
3
σz
σv
for ρ∗ = − 1√
3
= −.577, and decreases
to zero as ρ increases to one. The intensity β(ρ) increases from ρ = −1 to
ρ∗, and it attains the value σz
σv
when ρ equals −1 and 0.
In general will an increase in noise trading bring forth more informed
trading, so it does not destabilize prices as long as ρ < 1. When the correla-
tion becomes perfect, the insider responds by reducing his trade intensity to
zero, but since both parties are now in a sense equally well informed, prices
are still stable, and the liquidity parameter λ(ρ) attains its maximum value
of σv
σz
as ρ→ 1.
As ρ increases to one, the insider’s ability to camouflage his trade is at
its minimum. When ρ decreases to ρ∗, the insider’s need to hide his trade
decreases, but increases as ρ decreases further from ρ∗ to −1.
3.1 The various profits
The realized profits of the parties in a one shot auction are the following: The
realization of (v˜ − p˜)x˜ for the noise traders, and similarly the realizations of
(v˜− p˜)z˜ and (p˜− v˜)(x˜+ z˜) for the insider and the market makers respectively.
The latter follows since the market makers set the price p˜ and faces the final
price v˜ at a total quantity y˜ = x˜ + z˜ traded. All these profits may have
various signs, but sum to zero with probability one, since we deal with a pure
exchange economy. Let us study expected and various conditional expected
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values of these profits. The market makers set prices such that their expected
profits is equal to zero. This follows by the rules of conditional expectation:
E{(p˜− v˜)(x˜+ z˜)} = E{(E(v˜|y˜)y˜ − v˜y˜} =
E{E(v˜y˜|y˜)− v˜y˜} = E(v˜y˜)− E(v˜y˜) = 0,
where the third equality follows by iterated expectations. Given that the
market makers observe a total quantity traded equal to y, the conditional
expectation of their profits is
E{(p˜− v˜)(x˜+ z˜)|y˜ = y} = y2
(
λ− βσ
2
v + ρσzσv
β2σ2v + σ
2
z + 2βρ σzσv
)
= 0 for all y
in equilibrium, where we have used the joint normality of the variables in-
volved, and where (2.3) implies the last equality sign. Thus, even if the
market makers earn or lose in one single shot of the auction, their condi-
tional expected profit is always zero for any value y of the total quantity
traded.
Moving to the insider, also his realized profit in one round of trade may
be positive or negative. However, his conditional expected profit given the
information he has is the following:
E{(v˜ − p˜)x˜|v˜ = v} = 1
2
(v − p0)2σz
σv
(2− ρ2 − ρ√4− 3ρ2√
4− 3ρ2
)
.
From this it follows immediately by averaging this expression over the dis-
tribution of v˜ that the expected profits of the insider is given by
E{(v˜ − p˜)x˜) = 1
2
σzσv
(2− ρ2 − ρ√4− 3ρ2√
4− 3ρ2
)
.
Fig. 4 illustrates the latter as a function of ρ when σz = σv = 1.
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Fig. 4: Insider’s average profit as a function of ρ
As the figure indicates, the average profit is positive, and a decreasing
function of the correlation coefficient ρ. When ρ = −1 the profit is σzσv,
when ρ = 0 it is 1
2
σzσv, and when ρ = 1 the profit is zero. The insider’s
ability to mislead the noise traders pays off for him and yields a maximal
expected profit when this ability is perfected, which is twice as large as
the corresponding profit in the uncorrelated case. When the insider trades
against informed noise traders on the other hand, his profit decreases as the
noise traders become more informed, and in the limit when ρ→ 1, this profit
goes to zero.
This is the situation when we repeat the auction over and over again.
The expression for the conditional expected profit given that v˜ = v can be
interpreted as what the insider can expect to earn if v is his true inside
information about the price of the risky asset. It has the same form as a
function of the correlation coefficient ρ as the unconditional expectation, but
depends in addition on how far the value v is from the expected value p0.
The bigger this difference, the more the insider can expect to make. In the
gambling analogue, the bigger the difference (v − p0)2, the higher are the
odds in favor of the casino.
Finally considering the noise traders, some of them may win and some
lose in any single round of the auction and the same can happen in aggregate.
However, given that they trade the amount z˜ = z, how much can they expect
to earn? This amount is
E{(v˜ − p˜)z˜|z˜ = z} = 1
2
z2
σv
σz
(ρ2 − 2 + ρ√4− 3ρ2√
4− 3ρ2
)
.
In a repeated version of this market, the average profit of the noise traders
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is accordingly
E{(v˜ − p˜)z˜} = 1
2
σvσz
(ρ2 − 2 + ρ√4− 3ρ2√
4− 3ρ2
)
.
Its graph is shown in Fig. 5 as a function of ρ when σz = σv = 1.
Fig. 5: Noise traders’ average profit as a function of ρ
By comparing with the insider’s profit, it is seen to be exactly the same
in absolute value, but with an opposite sign. This is verified by our above
results: Since the sum of the profits are zero for all states of the world, the
sum of the expected profits must also equal zero. We have shown that the
market makers earn zero average profits, so the noise traders profits plus the
insiders profits must equal zero on average. This is confirmed by the above
calculations.
Returning to our question raised above, given that the noise traders trade
the amount z, they can merely expect to make negative profits as long as
ρ < 1. This expected loss is larger the larger the amount z traded, which
also has a clear counterpart in the gambling analogue mentioned earlier.
This conditional expected profit has the same form as the expected profits
shown in Fig. 5, as a function of the correlation coefficient ρ. When they
are equally informed as the insider, i.e., when ρ = 1, the best they can hope
for in expectation (and conditional expectation given z˜ = z) is zero profits,
which is then also the expected profit (and the conditional expected profit
given v˜ = v) of the insider.
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4 Summary
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle’s (1985) is studied, in which noise
traders may be partially informed, or alternatively they can be manipulated.
Unlike Kyle’s assumption that the quantity traded by the noise traders is
independent of the asset value, we assume that the noise traders are able to
correlate their trade with the true price.
We found several implications from this ability for the equilibrium, one
being that the insider’s expected profit decreases as the noise traders’ ability
to correlate positively improves. This also happens to the insider’s condi-
tional expected profits, given his particular inside information. In the limit,
the noise traders do not lose on average, and the insider makes zero expected
profits. When the correlation is negative, we interpret this as manipula-
tion. In this case the insider makes the highest expected profits, and the
informativeness of prices are at its minimum.
The market depth is a symmetric, concave function of the correlation
coefficient ρ between the noise traders traded amount and the value of the
risky asset. This shows that the market makers’ propensity to compensate
themselves for bad trades due to adverse selection of insiders is diminished
when this correlation ρ moves away from zero.
The informativeness of prices is, on the other hand, an antisymmetric
function of the correlation coefficient. This measure is at its minimum of 0
when ρ = −1, increases to one half of this when ρ = 0, and then further
increases to 1 when ρ→ 1. This shows that when when speculators become
equally well informed, it is easier for the market makers to infer the true price.
When insiders mislead the public on the other hand, the informativeness in
prices decreases, and at the same time the insider makes his greatest expected
profits.
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